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Abstract
Econometric inference allows an analyst to back out the values of agents in a mechanism
from the rules of the mechanism and bids of the agents. This paper proposes the problem of
inferring the values of agents in a mechanism from the social choice function implemented by
the mechanism and the per-unit prices paid by the agents (the agent bids are not observed). For
single-dimensional agents, this inference problem is a multi-dimensional inversion of the payment
identity and is feasible only if the payment identity is uniquely invertible. The inversion is unique
for single-unit proportional weights social choice functions (common, for example, in bandwidth
allocation); and its inverse can be found efficiently. This inversion is not unique for social choice
functions that exhibit complementarities.
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1
1 Introduction
Traditional econometric inference allows an analyst to determine the values of agents from their
equilibrium actions and the rules of a mechanism (Guerre et al., 2000; Haile and Tamer, 2003).
This paper studies an inference problem when only the profile of the agents’ per-unit prices is
available to the analyst. Such an inference may be applicable when bids are kept private but
prices are published; moreover, it is of interest even for incentive compatible mechanisms (where
agents truthfully report their preferences). As a motivating example, with the per-unit prices from
the incentive compatible mechanism for allocating a divisible item proportionally to agent values
(cf. Johari and Tsitsiklis, 2004), we prove that agents’ values are uniquely determined and can be
computed efficiently.
Econometric inference is a fundamental topic in a data-driven approach to mechanism design
and a number of recent papers have been developing its algorithmic foundations. The following are
prominent examples. Chawla et al. (2014, 2016) show that the revenue and welfare of a counter
factual auction can be estimated directly from Bayes-Nash equilibrium bids in an incumbent auc-
tion. Nekipelov et al. (2015) develop methods for identifying the rationalizable set of agent values
and regret parameters in repeated auctions with learning agents. Hoy et al. (2017) show that the
quantities that govern price-of-anarchy analyses can be determined directly from bid data and,
thus, empirical price-of-anarchy bounds can be established that improve on the theoretical worst
case.
There are two important questions in algorithmic econometrics. First, when are the values are
uniquely identified? Second, can the values be efficiently computed when the values are identifiable?
The first question is studied in depth by the econometrics literature (for inference from actions);
the second question is an opportunity for algorithms design and analysis.
We consider inference in single-dimensional environments where a stochastic social choice func-
tion maps profiles of agent values to profiles of allocation probabilities. The characterization of
incentive compatibility (Myerson, 1981) requires the allocation probability of an agent be mono-
tonically non-decreasing in that agent’s value and that an agent’s expected payments satisfy a
payment identity. Per-unit prices – the expected payments conditioned on winning – are easily
determined from the total payments in the payment identity by normalizing by the allocation
probability.1 Consequentially, given any social choice function and valuation profile, the allocation
probabilities and prices of an incentive compatible mechanism that implements the social choice
function are uniquely and easily determined. Our inference problem is the opposite. Given the
profile of the agents’ prices, determine the valuation profile that leads to these prices. The social
choice function and, thus, the function mapping values to prices is known. The resulting inversion
problem is multi-dimensional and this multi-dimensionality leads to a possibility of non-uniqueness
(and consequentially, non-identifiability) and computational challenges.
The first goal of this paper is to understand what social choice functions admit inference from
prices and which do not. Fundamentally, social choice functions with induced allocation rules that
are not strictly increasing do not admit inference. For example, inference possible from the outcome
of a second-price auction is only that the winner has value above the winner’s price and the losers
1Our methods are written assuming that per-unit prices are observed rather than total payments. These prices
are more natural for mechanisms usually considered in algorithmic mechanism design as they arise in mechanisms
where losers pay nothing, i.e., ex post individually rational mechanism. If instead the realized expected payments
and realized allocation probabilities are observed, then these per-unit prices can be easily calculated and our methods
applied to the result.
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have value below the winner’s price. On the other hand, a “soft max” social choice function like
proportional values, where an agent receives a fraction of the item proportional to her value, is
strictly continuous and, as we will show, the valuation profile can be uniquely inferred from the
outcome. We will characterize social choice functions that admit inference from prices as ones
where the Jacobian of the payment identity is positive definite and we will show that, generally,
proportional weights social choice functions (with general strictly monotonic weight functions)
satisfy this property. In contrast we show that this property does not generally hold for social
choice functions that exhibit complimentarities.
These identification and non-identification results are complemented by an algorithm for effi-
ciently computing the valuation profile from the prices that corresponds to any proportional weights
social choice function for single-item environments.
Organization. The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives notation for dis-
cussing social choice functions, mechanisms, and agents; reviews the characterization of incentive-
compatible single-dimensional mechanisms; and reviews proportional weights allocations. Section 3,
then, gives an algorithmic framework for robustly identifying values from prices. It shows that val-
ues are identified from payments corresponding to social choice functions given by proportional
weights in single-item and multi-unit environments. Section 3.3 shows that values are not identi-
fiable from prices for proportional weights allocations that correspond to environments with com-
plenentarities. Section 4 gives an efficient algorithm for infering values from prices for proportional
weights social choice functions in single-item environments.
2 Preliminaries
This paper considers general environments for single-dimensional linear agents. Each agent i has
value vi ∈ [0, h]; for allocation probability xi and expected payment pi, the agent’s utility is vi xi−pi.
A profile of n agent values is denoted v = (v1, . . . , vn); the profile with agent i’s value replaced with
z is (z,v−i) = (v1, . . . , vi−1, z, vi+1, . . . , vn).
A stochastic social choice function x maps a profile of values v to a profile of allocation proba-
bilities. A dominant strategy incentive compatible (DSIC) mechanism (x,p) maps a profile of values
v to profiles of allocations x(v) and payments p(v) so that: for all agents i, values vi, and other
agent values v−i, it is optimal for agent i to bid her value vi. The following theorem of Myerson
(1981) characterizes social choice functions that can be implemented by DSIC mechanisms.
Theorem 1. (Myerson, 1981) Allocation and payment rules (x,p) are induced by a dominant
strategy incentive compatible mechanism if and only if for each agent i,
1. (monotonicity) allocation rule xi(z,v−i) is monotone non-decreasing in z, and
2. (payment identity) payment rule pi(v) satisfies
pi(v) = vi xi(v)−
∫ vi
0
xi(z,v−i) dz + pi(0,v−i), (1)
where the payment of an agent with value zero is often zero, i.e., pi(0,v−i) = 0.
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Most DSIC mechanisms are implemented to satisfy an ex post individual rationality constraint;
specifically, an agent pays nothing when she is not allocated. Her payment when she is allocated,
i.e., her per-unit price, is thus her expected payment normalized by her winning probability. Denote
the price function by pi : Rn+ → R
n
+, as
πi(v) = pi(v)/xi(v) (2)
= vi +
∫ vi
0 xi(z,v−i) dz
xi(v)
(3)
for all agents i.
The main objective of this paper is to infer the agents’ values from observations of the per-unit
prices of the mechanism. A price profile ρ is observed, and it is desired to infer the valuation
profile v that generated this price profile by ρ = pi(v). The key question of this paper is to identify
sufficient conditions on the social choice function x such that the price function pi is invertible.
An important special case is the case where there is n = 1 agent and the price function π(·) is
single-dimensional. When the social choice function x(·) is strictly increasing, the price function
π(·) is strictly increasing,2 and is uniquely invertible. Thus, the agent’s value can be identified from
her observed price ρ, e.g., by binary search.
Our goal is to understand families of (multi-agent) social choice functions x that allow values
to be inferred from prices. Clearly, as in the single-agent case, if the allocation rule is not strictly
increasing in each agent’s value, then the values of the agents cannot be inferred. We assume that
the social choice function x is such that it has strictly-increasing allocation functions xi for any given
v−i, for all vi > 0. The mechanisms in the literature for welfare and revenue maximization are based
on social choice functions that map agents’ values to weights and allocate to maximize the sum of
the weights of the agents allocated. In order to satisfy the required strict monotonicity property,
our focus is on smoothed versions of these social choice functions under feasibility constraints that
correspond to single-item and single-minded combinatorial auctions.
In single-item environments a natural “soft max” is given by proportional weights allocations.
A weight function is given for each agent i as a strictly monotone and continuously differentiable
function wi : R+ → R+ and the proportional weights social choice function maps each agent’s
value to a weight and then allocates to an agent with probability proportional to her weight.3 A
canonical example of proportional weights is exponential weights, i.e., wi(vi) = e
vi for each agent i.
Given the assumptions on functions w, they are invertible. Where appropriate we will overload
vi to allow it to be the functional inverse of wi mapping a weight back to its value. We also overload
the notations x,pi to take weights w as an input, with x(w) := x(v(w)) and pi(w) := pi(v(w)).
3 Identification and Non-identification
This section considers sufficient conditions under which values can be inferred from the observed
prices ρ of a DSIC mechanism (x,p). We address two theoretical challenges with identifying values
from prices. First, values can only possibly be identified from prices if the price function pi is
2Observe that the derivative of the price function pi′(v) =
x′(v)
∫
v
0
x(z)dz
(x(v))2
is positive if x′(v) is positive.
3For simplicity in the main body of the paper, we assume that all weights functions are everywhere strictly positive
for all agents, even at vi = 0. The removal of this assumption is handled as a technical extension.
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invertible. Second, the image of the price function pi may not be a product space; for robustness of
the inference algorithm, we desire a mapping for any observed prices ρ back to a profile of values.4
Our approach to these challenges is to write the problem of inverting the price function pi at
prices ρ as a proxy game between proxy players whose actions are values; and where the payoff
function of a proxy player i for a proxy value v˜i – given the profile of proxy values from the other
proxy players v˜−i – is a concave function that is optimized where pi(v˜) on the proxy valuation
profile is closest to the observed bid ρi. For fixed observed prices ρ, define the price-imbalance
function and the cumulative price-imbalance as
φρi (v˜i, v˜−i) = ρi − πi(v˜i, v˜−i) = ρi − v˜i +
∫ v˜i
0 xi(z, v˜−i) dz
xi(v˜)
, (4)
Φρi (v˜i, v˜−i) =
∫ v˜i
0
φρi (z, v˜−i) dz. (5)
The proxy game is defined with values v˜ as proxy actions, and with utilities for the proxy agents
given by the cumulative price-imbalance functions. As desired, when other players select proxy
values v˜−i, proxy player i would select proxy value v˜i so that agent i’s price according to pi on
v˜, i.e., πi(v˜) is closest to agent i’s given payment ρi. Based on this proxy game, we define the
following inference algorithm.
Definition 1. The price-inversion algorithm A on price space [0,∞]n for social choice function x
on value space [0, h]n is
1. Observe price profile ρ.
2. Select a Nash equilibrium v˜ in the proxy game defined in value space [0, h]n with utility
functions given by the cumulative price-imbalance Φρ for ρ.
3. Return inferred values v˜.
A key property for the proper working of the price-inversion algorithm is whether the proxy
game admits a unique pure Nash equilibrium. For example, if there are multiple distinct valuation
profiles that map to the same prices via pi, then each of these valuation profiles will be an equilibrium
in the proxy game. The computational question of finding a Nash equilibrium of the proxy game
is deferred to Section 4.
Proposition 1. Any valuation profile v ∈ [0, h]n such that observed price profile ρ satisfies ρ =
pi(v) is a Nash equilibrium of the proxy game on the social choice function x and prices ρ; if this
Nash equilibrium v of the proxy game is unique then the inverse pi−1(ρ) is unique and given by the
price inversion algorithm A.
Proof. The second part follows from the first part. For the first part, assume ρ = pi(v) for some
v ∈ [0, h]n. Action profile v in the proxy game is a Nash equilibrium as each proxy agent’s first-
order condition is satisfied. Specifically, with utilities given by the cumulative imbalances Φρ, the
first-order condition is given by φρi (vi,v−i) = ρi−πi(vi,v−i) and is zero by the choice of v. Checking
first-order conditions is sufficient because Φρ is strictly concave, i.e.,
dφρi (vi,v−i)
dvi
= −π′i(v) < 0.
4Deferring detailed discussion to the full paper, this robustness will allow inference from even “noisy” or “erro-
neous” price profiles ρ˜ outside the image of the price function pi.
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Motivated by Proposition 1, the remainder of this section identifies proportional weights as a
large natural class of social choice functions for which the proxy game has a unique pure Nash equi-
librium for all price profiles. Of course, a necessary condition for the uniqueness of pure Nash in the
proxy game is that the price function pi is one-to-one. In Section 3.1 we show that this condition
is implied by a slightly weaker condition than the following: the positive definiteness everywhere
of the Jacobian of pi, denoted Jpi. In Section 3.2 we show that all members of the same class
of proportional weights social choice functions (for single-unit environments) induce bid functions
that satisfy this condition. In contrast, Section 3.3 describes some natural variants of proportional
weights social choice functions for environments which resemble single-minded combinatorial auc-
tions, and shows that the bid functions for these social choice functions are not generally invertible,
and therefore the proxy game does not have a unique pure Nash equilibrium in this extended
setting.
3.1 Sufficiency of “Interior” Positive Definiteness
This section shows that a sufficient condition for the uniqueness of a pure Nash equilibrium in
the proxy game defined in the price-inversion algorithm (Definition 1) is the “interior” positive
definiteness (to be defined shortly) of the Jacobian of the price function pi for the social choice rule
x. In this and the subsequent sections we make use of the following facts about positive definite
matrices:
Fact 1. A positive definite matrix M satisfies z⊤Mz > 0 for all z 6= 0. (Note: M is not required
to be symmetric.) Positive (semi-)definite matrices have the following properties:
• For a positive definite matrix M , its negation −M is negative definite.
• The product of two symmetric, positive definite matrices is also symmetric, positive definite.
• The sum of a positive definite matrix and a positive semi-definite matrix is positive definite.
• The sum of two positive semi-definite matrices M1,M2 is positive definite if ∀ z, they have
z
⊤M1z > 0 or z
⊤M2z > 0 (they are both at least 0 by assumption).
Define a function f : Rn → Rn to be positive definite if its Jacobian is positive definite at all
points of the function’s domain. We weaken this functional definition:
Definition 2. For product space Ω = [a1, b1] × [a2, b2] × · · · × [an, bn], a function f : Ω → R
n is
interior positive definite if for every point ω ∈ Ω:
• the Jacobian of f evaluated at ω as Jf (ω) is positive semi-definite, and,
• choosing the minor of Jf (ω) that removes row/column pairs corresponding to the dimensions
in which ω is on a closed boundary of Ω, this principal minor of Jf (ω) is positive definite.
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5This second requirement of interior positive definite at ω ∈ Ω is equivalent to saying that an ω has to pass the
z⊤Jf (ω)z > 0 “tests” of strictly positive definiteness on only a weakly smaller set of non-zero vectors z. It requires
only: z⊤Jf (ω)z > 0 ∀z ∈ {y|y 6= 0, yj = 0 ∀j such that ω ∈ {j-dimension boundary of product space Ω}}
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We show that when the Jacobian of the price function is interior positive definite, the proxy
game is related to concave games as defined and studied by Rosen (1965). Rosen shows that a
concave game has a unique and pure Nash equilibrium.6
Rosen defined concave games as games where utility functions are diagonally strictly concave,
a property which he also defined. He proves that negative definiteness of the pseudogradient of the
Jacobian of the utility functions (for all points in the action space) implies diagonal strict concavity.
Notice the structural comparisons which we have already set up: in the proxy game with utilities
given by Φρ, the pseudogradient is given by φρ, and the Jacobian of the pseudogradient is the
negation of the Jacobian of the function pi. We state two of Rosen’s main results (without needing
a formal definition of diagonal strict concavity for our purposes).
Theorem 2 (Rosen, 1965). A concave game, i.e., with a convex and compact action space and
diagonally strictly convex payoffs, has a unique Nash equilibrium, and this equilibrium is pure.
Lemma 1 (Rosen, 1965). A game where the pseudogradient of the Jacobian of the payoffs is
negative definite and the action space is convex and compact has payoffs that are diagonally strictly
concave; and therefore the game is a concave game.
Combining Lemma 1 and Theorem 2, a corollary would be that negative definite Jacobian of
pseudogradient of utilities is sufficient for existence and uniqueness of pure Nash equilibrium. A
direct proof of this corollary- with weaker conditions- was given by Gale and Nikaido (1965).7
Theorem 3 (Gale and Nikaido, 1965). A continuously differentiable function f : Ω ⊂ Rn → Rn
with convex Ω is one-to-one if its Jacobian is everywhere positive (or everywhere negative) definite.
We will need a generalization of these results that relaxes negative definiteness on axis aligned
boundary (as in Definition 2). Specifically, below in equation (7), the pseudogradient of the util-
ity function may be only negative semidefinite on the lower boundaries. It will be sufficient to
only prove interior negative definiteness as negative semidefiniteness on the boundary will then be
implied by continuity. The proof of Theorem 4 here is given in Appendix A.1.
Theorem 4. A game with n players and
• a compact and convex product action space Ωn ⊂ R
n;
• a continuous and twice-differentiable utility function U : Ωn → R
n;
• and a pseudogradient of the utility function U that is interior negative definite (Definition 2),
has a unique Nash equilibrium, and this equilibrium is pure.
Corollary 1. Given agents with (unknown) values v ∈ [0, h]n. Consider Jpi, the Jacobian of
the price function pi resulting from a strictly increasing, continuous and differentiable proportional
weights social choice function x, and dominant-strategy incentive-compatible mechanism imple-
menting x. If Jpi is interior positive definite, then:
6Though it will not be important for the results of this paper, Ui (2008) shows that the unique Nash equilibrium
of a concave game is, in fact, unique among correlated equilibria as well.
7Note that for the similar question of whether or not a function gives a bijection between two non-closed subspaces
of Rn, negative definiteness of the Jacobian is not sufficient. See, e.g., page 106 of Katok and Climenhaga (2008).
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• the inverse function pi−1 given by the unique Nash of the proxy game is well-defined everywhere
on a universal domain as Rn;
• and in particular on the restricted domain ρ ∈ Image(pi), the price-inversion algorithm A
(Definition 1) infers the true values v from the mechanism’s outcome (summarized by prices
ρ = pi(v)).
Proof. In the proxy game with payoffs given by Φρ, the pseudogradient of the payoffs is given by
φρ, and the Jacobian of the pseudogradient is the negation of the matrix Jpi. Interior positive
definiteness of Jpi is equivalent to interior negative definiteness of its negation. Thus, the proxy
game is concave (Lemma 1) and admits a unique Nash equilibrium which is pure (Theorem 2).
Defining the inverse function pi−1 to output the unique Nash of the proxy game is sufficient for its
output to be unique.
Finally, Proposition 1 implies that the price-inversion algorithm outputs the true values v when
the input is true prices ρ. The construction of the proxy game and Theorem 4 proves that interior
positive definiteness of Jpi implies that pi has a unique functional inverse when restricted to its
range.
In the subsequent subsections we prove that proportional weights social choice functions for a
single-item induces price functions with interior positive definite Jacobian. Thus, the price-inversion
algorithm for these social choice functions identifies correct value parameters of the agents from
the observed prices.
3.2 Single Item Proportional Weights Social Choice Functions
The goal of this section is to show that every proportional weights social choice function awarding
a single item yields price function pi whose Jacobian Jpi is positive definite (thereby satisfying
sufficient conditions from the previous section). We give the main result of the paper:
Theorem 5. Given agents with (unknown) values v ∈ [0, h]n. For a strictly monotone, continuous,
differentiable proportional weights social choice rule x, the price inversion algorithm of Definition 1
meets the conditions of Proposition 1 and outputs the true values v by inference from the dominant-
strategy incentive-compatible mechanism’s outcome (summarized by ρ), on every valuation profile
v ∈ [0, h]n.
Proof. The claim follows from Corollary 1 in Section 3.1 and Theorem 7 below.
It will be convenient to restate the inversion problem of Theorem 5 in weight space rather
than value space. Recall, weights functions wi(vi) are continuously differentiable, positive, strictly
increasing functions mapping an agent’s value to weight. Defined as such, they can be inverted as
vi(wi) := w
−1
i (vi). Recalling equation (3), we can transform the price function pi to weights-space
using calculus-change-of-variables as:
πi(w) = vi(wi)−
∫ wi
wi(0)
xi(z,w−i)v
′
i(z)dz
xi(w)
. (6)
It is straightforward to calculate the cross derivatives which appear as elements of the Jacobian Jpi
(the steps of the calculations are given in Appendix A.2).
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∂πi
∂wi
(w) =
∫ wi
wi(0)
v′i(z)
1
wi
·
z
(
∑
k wk)− wi + z
·
[∑
k wk
wi
− 1
]
dz (7)
∂πi
∂wj
(w) =
∫ wi
wi(0)
v′i(z)
1
wi
·
z
(
∑
k wk)− wi + z
·
[ ∑
k wk
(
∑
k wk)− wi + z
− 1
]
dz (8)
Lemma 2. Given the price function pi for proportional weights, for j, k 6= i, the cross derivatives
are the same: ∂pii∂wj =
∂pii
∂wk
. Evaluating the Jacobian at w, further, all elements of the Jacobian
matrix Jpi are positive, i.e.,
∂pii
∂wi
> 0, ∂pii∂wj > 0, except at the wi(0) lower boundary in dimension i
where the elements of row i are ∂pii∂wi =
∂pii
∂wj
= 0.
The proof of Lemma 2 is in Appendix A.3.
By Theorem 3 we only need to prove that the the Jacobian Jpi of the price function is interior
positive definite at every w. Without loss of generality we can assume that the coordinates of
w in which it is on the weights-space boundary are the largest indexes. We critically consider
only the principal minor of Jpi which results from keeping the first N interior dimensions as is
sufficient for interior positive definite. We explicitly define the ratio of an agent’s “self-partial” to
its “cross-partial” for any j 6= i by hi, which will be needed for analysis throughout the rest of the
paper.8
hi =
∂πi
∂wi
/
∂πi
∂wj
(9)
Using Lemma 2, we write the Jacobian principal minor as
Jpi,N = D ·H =


∂π1/∂w2 0 0 . . . 0
0 ∂π2/∂w1 0 . . . 0
0 0 ∂π3/∂w1 . . . 0
...
...
...
. . .
...
0 0 0 . . . ∂πN/∂w1

 ·


h1 1 1 . . . 1
1 h2 1 . . . 1
1 1 h3 . . . 1
...
...
...
. . .
...
1 1 1 . . . hN

 (10)
Multiplying by a positive diagonal matrix D is a benign operation with respect to the deter-
mination of positive definiteness. We will define H to be the matrix on the right of equation (10)
which is composed of his on the diagonal and all ones elsewhere. By reduction we need only show
that H is positive definite.
We claim the following results, starting with a complete characterization of when an arbitrary
matrix G with arbitrary gi is positive definite, a result which could be of independent interest.
Theorem 6. Consider a matrix G with diagonal g1, g2, ..., gn and all other entries equal to 1 (and
without loss of generality g1 ≤ g2 ≤ . . . ≤ gn). The following is a complete characterization of when
G is positive definite.
1. if g1 ≤ 0, then the matrix G is not positive definite;
2. if g1 ≥ 1 and g2 > 1, then G is positive definite;
8Technically the hi terms are functions, each of input w, but we suppress this in the notation.
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3. if g1, g2 ≤ 1, then G is not positive definite;
4. if g1 < 1 and g2 > 1, then G is positive definite if and only if
∑
k
1
1−gk
> 1.
The proof of Theorem 6 is given in Appendix A.4 where the main difficulty is part (4). Theo-
rem 6 is for arbitrary G. We now return to the specific consideration of H resulting from pi and
Jpi,N , showing it must be covered by cases (2) or (4) from Theorem 6. The proofs of Lemma 3 and
Lemma 4 are given in Appendix A.5.
Lemma 3. If hi ≤ 1, then wi > 0.5
∑
k wk, and all other weights must have wj < 0.5
∑
k wk (and
hj > 1).
Lemma 4. When h1 < 1 and hj > 1 ∀j 6= 1, we have
∑
k
1
1−hk
> 1.
Theorem 7. Let matrix Jpi be the Jacobian of pi at weights w of a positive, strictly increasing,
and differentiable proportional weights social choice functions. Jpi is interior positive definite.
Proof. By the definition of interior positive definiteness (Definition 2), we consider the restriction
to the minor Jpi,N = D ·H where coordinates on the boundary of price space have been discarded,
see (10). Since weights {wi}i∈{1,...,N} are interior, Lemma 2 implies that {hi}i∈{1,...,N} are strictly
positive. By Lemma 3, at most one agent i has hi ≤ 1. Without loss of generality, we can set this
i = 1. So there are just two cases:
1. h1 ≥ 1 and hj > 1 ∀j 6= 1, and
2. 0 < h1 < 1 and hj > 1 ∀j 6= 1.
These are respectively cases (2) and (4) of Theorem 6. To satisfy the condition within case (4)
of Theorem 6, Lemma 4 is sufficient. Thus, the factor H of the Jacobian minor Jpi,N is positive
definite, and so is the product Jpi,N = D ·H.
3.3 Impossibility Results for Complementarities
In this section we show that natural generalizations of the proportional weights social choice func-
tions to environments with complementarities between agents cannot identify the values of the
agents from the outcome of the mechanism.
The impossibility result we present will consider a generalization of exponential weights to
environments with complementarities. We will consider the special case where the agents are
partitioned and the mechanism can allocate to all agents in any one part, but agents in multiple
parts may not be simultaneously served. We prove that a natural extension of exponential weights
to partition set systems results in a price function pi that is not one-to-one. Thus, it is not invertible,
no algorithm can distinguish between the two (or more) valuation profiles that give the same prices.
Definition 3. The exponential weights social choice function for an n-agent partition set system
with parts S = (S1, · · · , Sr) is given by:
• vS =
∑
i∈S vi for S ∈ S;
• xS(v) =
evS∑
T∈S e
vT
for S ∈ S;
• xi(v) = xS(v) for i ∈ S
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Figure 1: Graphing the “function” (π1 − π5)(α) from the proof of Lemma 5. The zeroes of the
function parameterize values for agents in S1 and S2 such that all agents across both parts have
identical bids, despite the agents of each group having strictly distinct values from each other. (By
design, the curve is rotationally symmetric around the point (5, 0).)
The resulting price function corresponding to the exponential weights social choice function for
partition set systems is
πi(v) = vi −
∫ vi
0 xi(z,v−i)dz
xi(v)
= vi −
∑
T e
vT
evS
∫ vi
0
ezevS\{i}
ezevS\{i} +
∑
T 6=S e
vT
dz
= vi −
∑
T e
vT
evS
(
ln
(∑
T
evT
)
− ln
(
evS\{i} +
∑
T 6=S
evT
))
The completion of the counter-example is in the following lemma.
Lemma 5. The price function pi corresponding to the exponential weights social choice function for
partition set systems (with at least one partition containing two or more agents) is not one-to-one.
Proof. We prove that the price function is not one-to-one (consequentially by the contrapositive
of Corollary 1 its Jacobian is not positive definite). We first set up a parameterized analysis and
then choose the parameters later.
Let there be k agents in set S1 who all have the same valuation α/k, and another k agents in
set S2 who all have the same valuation (β − α)/k. Note β = vS1 + vS2 . Players in all other sets
Sr, r > 2 have a constant value vothers and can be summarized by a single parameter δ by letting
eδ =
∑
r>2 e
vSr . Parameters k, α, β and vothers will be determined later.
Then the price for agent 1 in part S1 is
π1 =
α
k
−
eα + eβ−α + eδ
eα
[ln(eα + eβ−α + eδ)− ln(e(1−1/k)α + eβ−α + eδ)]
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The price for agent k + 1 in part S2 is
πk+1 =
β − α
k
−
eα + eβ−α + eδ
eβ−α
[ln(eα + eβ−α + eδ)− ln(e(1−1/k)(β−α) + eα + eδ)]
It is possible that player 1 and player k + 1 have different valuations but are charged the same
prices. Consider the case k = 4, β = 10, and there is one additional part S3 with a single agent 9
with v9 = vothers = 4 inducing δ = 4. Then we can consider the quantity (π1 − π5) as a function of
parameter α with v1 = ... = v4 = α/4 and v5 = ... = v8 = (10− α)/4.
This function (π1 − π5)(α) is graphed in Figure 1, where we can see that there are three
solutions for π1 = π5. Then (without showing the calculation), π1 = π5 holds for a value profile
where v1 = ...v4 = α/4 ≈ 0.375 and v5 = ... = v8 = (β − α)/4 ≈ 2.125, and v9 = 4. In this case,
the seller cannot tell between S1 and S2 which part has agents with identical values ≈ 0.375 versus
the other part whose agents all have values ≈ 2.125.
This lemma can be generalized as follows. A set system is downward-closed if all subsets of
feasible sets are feasible. Agents are substitutes if the set system satisfies the matroid augmentation
property, i.e., for any pair of feasible sets with distinct cardinalities, an element from the smaller
set that is not in the larger set can be added to the larger set and the resulting set remains
feasible. A set system exhibits complementarities if agents are substitutes (i.e., there exists sets
that fail the augmentation property). Exponential weights can be generalized to any set system by
choosing a maximal set with probability proportional to its exponentiated weight. The impossibility
result above can then be easily generalized to any set system that exhibits complementarities by
identifying the sets and taking S1 and S2 to be the agents uniquely in each set (i.e., and not in
their intersection) and setting all other agent values to zero.
4 Computational Methods for Inverting the Price Function
In Section 3, we gave a well-defined, continuous function that inverts the payment identity pi to map
prices ρ back to weights w (equivalently, values v). The price-inversion algorithm (Definition 1)
is straightforward except for Step 2 which requires the computation of a Nash equilibrium in the
defined proxy game. In this section we give a simple algorithm for identifying a Nash equilibrium
of the proxy game and thus show that the inverse function can be easily computed.
The algorithm for solving for solving the proxy game is enabled by two observations. First,
for player i, the sum of weights s =
∑
k wk summarizes everything that needs to be known about
the other players and this observation leads to a many-to-one reduction in the dimension of search
space. Consequently, the price function can be rewritten as a function π¯i(s,wi).
9 Second, because
the price function pi is invertible, the sum s is uniquely determined from the prices.
Obviously at most one agent can have strictly more than half the total weight s. For the rest
of this section, without loss of generality we fix agent i∗ to mean that wi∗ is not restricted and
wi ≤ s/2 for all i 6= i
∗.
Fix observed input prices ρ. For any agent i, consider the set of points (s,wi) for which π¯i
outputs ρi. Our first key Lemma 6 will show that, restricting to the space wi ≤ s/2, this set of
points can be interpreted as a real-valued, monotone decreasing function of s, denoted wρi (·). With
9See equation (27) in Appendix B.
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this property holding for all agents other than i∗, we can express the price function for agent i∗
with dependence on prices ρ−i∗ and sum s.
10
πρi∗(s) := πi∗(max{s −
∑
i 6=i∗
wρi (s), wi∗(0)},w
ρ
−i∗(s)) (11)
where, for guess s, the quantity s−
∑
i 6=i∗ w
ρ
i (s) assigns an intermediate guess of wi∗ as the “balance”
of the quantity s having subtracted the implied weights of the “small” agents for guess s.11 Our
second key Lemma 7 (below) shows that, on the range of s for which it is well-defined, the function
πρi∗ is strictly monotonically increasing.
This setup suggests a natural binary search procedure. For some agent i∗ and small initial guess
of s, the implied price for i∗ is smaller than the observed input, i.e. πρi∗(s) < ρi∗ . A large guess of
s implying too big of a price and monotonicity will then guarantee a crossing. The algorithm has
the following steps:
1. Find an agent i∗ by iteratively running the following for each fixed assignment of agent
i ∈ {1, . . . , n}:
(a) temporarily set i∗ = i;
(b) determine the range of s on which πρi∗ is well-defined and searching is appropriate;
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(c) if this range of s is non-empty, permanently fix i∗ = i and break the for-loop;
2. use the monotonicity of πρi∗ to binary search on s for the true s
∗, converging πρi∗(s) to ρi∗ ;
3. when the binary search has been run to satisfactory precision and reached a final estimate s˜,
output weights w˜ = (s˜ −
∑
i 6=i∗ w
ρ
i (s˜),w
ρ
−i∗(s˜)) which invert to values v˜ via respective vi(·)
functions.
The rest of this section formalizes our key results.
4.1 Computation through Total Sum Weights
The following theorem claims correctness of the algorithm, and is the main result of this section.
Theorem 8. Given weights w and payments ρ = pi(w) according to a proportional weights social
choice function, the algorithm identifies weights w˜ within ǫ of the true weights w in time polynomial
in the number of agents n, the logarithm of the ratio of high to low weights maxi ln(wi(h)/wi(0)),
and the logarithm of the desired precision ln 1/ǫ.
A major object of interest for this sequence of results is the price level set defined by Qρi =
{(s,wi) | π¯i(s,wi) = ρi}, i.e., all of the (s,wi) pairs that result in the input price ρi, and also in
particular its subset Pρi = {(s,wi) | π¯i(s,wi) = ρi and wi ≤ s/2} ⊆ Q
ρ
i which restricts the set to the
region where wi is at most half the total weight s. Define r
ρ
i = min{s : (s,wi) ∈ P
ρ
i } as the lower
bound on the sum s on which the set Pρi is supported. These quantities are depicted in Figure 2.
We give the formal statements of the two most critical lemmas supporting Theorem 8.
10A note for functions wρi and pi
ρ
i∗ . We write them both indexed by vector ρ to demark them in a common, simple
way because their usage is always related. However ρ implies an over-dependence on parameters. wρi only uses ρi,
and piρi∗ uses all of ρ−i∗ but not ρi∗ .
11When the guess wi∗ = s−
∑
i6=i∗ w
ρ
i (s) is irrationally small or even negative, the structure of the problem allows
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swi
rρi
wi(h)
wi(0)
s s/2
Qρi
Pρi
Figure 2: The price level set curve Qρi = {(s,wi) : π¯i(s,wi) = ρi} (thick, gray, dashed), is decreasing
below the wi = s/2 line (Lemma 6) where it is defined by its subset P
ρ
i (thin, black, solid). It is
bounded above by the wi = s line (trivially as s sums over all weights) and the wi = wi(h) line (the
maximum weight in the support of the values), and below by the wi = wi(0) line which we have
assumed to be strictly positive. rρi is the minimum weight-sum consistent with observed price ρi
and weights wi ≤ s/2.
Lemma 6. The price level set Qρi is a curve; further, restricting Q
ρ
i to the region wi ≤ s/2, the
resulting subset Pρi can be written as {(s,w
ρ
i (s)) : s ∈ [r
ρ
i ,∞)} for a real-valued decreasing function
wρi mapping sum s to a weight wi that is parameterized by the observed price ρi.
Lemma 7. For any agent i∗ and s ∈ [maxj 6=i∗ r
ρ
j ,∞), function π
ρ
i∗ is strictly increasing.
A key step in the proof of Lemma 7 will depend on Lemma 4, so we will see that the correctness
of our algorithm’s technique is critically related to the proof of existence of a unique inverse in the
first place. The 11−hk terms in the statement of Lemma 4 are realized to be the derivatives of the
wρi functions.
We give the proofs of Theorem 8, Lemma 6, and Lemma 7 in Appendix B.3. Preceding these
proofs within Appendix B.1 is a more detailed analysis of the structure of the search space, with a
more explicit description of the binary search algorithm in Appendix B.2.
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A Supporting Material for Section 3
A.1 Proof of Theorem 4
First, existence is from Rosen.
Theorem 9 (Rosen, 1965). A game with a convex and compact action space in which all the
utilities functions are individually continuous and continuously differentiable and weakly concave
has a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies. In particular, the utility function having Jacobian of the
pseudogradient which is negative semi-definite is sufficient.
The following re-statement and proof of Theorem 4 subsumes Theorem 9 (as well as extending
Theorem 2). Also note that the statement of Theorem 4 here has been appended to unpack the
definition of interior negative definite and define this assumption in terms of the notation of the
proxy game and new notation as needed in the proof.
Theorem 4. A game with n players and
1. a compact product action space Ωn ⊂ R
n;
2. a continuous and twice-differentiable utility function U : Ωn → R
n;
3. and a pseudogradient of the utility function U that is interior negative definite (Definition 2),
14
has a unique Nash equilibrium, and this equilibrium is pure.
Proof. Re-writing (3) explicitly in the notation of the theorem statement, (3) is equivalent to
assuming the following condition on the Jacobian of the pseudogradient of U denoted JpgU :
• for all points a strictly interior to the action space, JpgU (a) is negative definite;
• for points a on the boundary of the action space, specifically on the boundary with respect
to all dimensions in a set C(a), JpgU (a) can be either negative definite, or negative semi-
definite, however: where JpgU (a) is negative semi-definite, it must be that its principal minor
removing rows/columns corresponding to the set C(a) as JpgU−C.(a−C.) is negative definite.
13
The following proof is adapted from Rosen’s proof of the sufficiency of a diagonal strictly concave
JpgU matrix, and the Gale-Nikkaido proof of Theorem 3. First, existence of Nash in pure strategies
follows quite simply from Rosen and Theorem 9.
For uniqueness, by contradiction, assume there are two action vectors a0 and a1 that are both
Nash equilibria in the game.
Because the action space is a compact product space, and resulting from the assumption of
negative semi-definite JpgU everywhere, at any equilibrium a
eq the following first-order conditions
are necessary (and sufficient) in each dimension i:
• if aeqi is the smallest action type possible in player i’s closed and bounded action space in R,
then the partial ∂Ui∂ai (a
eq) ≤ 0;
• if aeqi is the largest action type possible, then
∂Ui
∂ai
(aeq) ≥ 0;
• if aeqi is strictly interior to player i’s action space, then
∂Ui
∂ai
(aeq) = 0.
Let vector aλ be a linear combination as
aλ = a0 + λ(a1 − a0)
Define the pseudogradient vector U ′ =
[
∂Ui
∂ai
]
{i}
and the function
f(λ) =
[
U ′(aλ)
]⊤
· (a1 − a0)
and then simple evaluation gives:
f(0) =
[
U ′(a0)
]⊤
· (a1 − a0)
f(1) =
[
U ′(a1)
]⊤
· (a1 − a0)
Consider the change in the value of the function f between inputs 0 and 1 as
0 = f(1)− f(0) =
[
U ′(a1)
]⊤
· (a1 − a0)−
[
U ′(a0)
]⊤
· (a1 − a0) (12)
=
[
U ′(a1)
]⊤
· (a1 − a0) +
[
U ′(a0)
]⊤
· (a0 − a1) (13)
13Let the notation (C.) within a−C. denote the reminder that C is itself a function of the original a vector.
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(See footnote for the connection from this point to Rosen’s definition of a diagonally strictly concave
function f .)14
Working from equation (13), we note that its two terms each have the following general form:
[U ′(aeq)] ·
(
aeq − aother
)
≥ 0. Within the dot product over the dimensions, each term in the sum
at coordinate j must be individually non-negative, by the first order conditions at Nash described
above. Recall the action space is a closed product space. Specifically we have:
• if an individual coordinate aeqj is an interior point, then U
′
j(a
eq) = 0 from first order conditions
at Nash, and
[
U ′j(a
eq)
]
·
(
a
eq
j − a
other
j
)
= 0 as well;
• if aeqj is the smallest action type for player j, then the partial
∂Uj
∂aj
(aeq) ≤ 0 is non-positive;
but also
(
aeq − aother
)
is a vector coming into aeq, and in the dimension j the ending point
has the smallest type such that regardless of the starting point we get
(
a
eq
j − a
other
j
)
≤ 0,
and we conclude
[
U ′j(a
eq)
]
·
(
a
eq
j − a
other
j
)
≥ 0;
• by symmetry, the argument for the smallest type holds for the largest action types as well,
with both inequalities flipped.
From this analysis, we get that f(1) ≥ f(0). Function f is continuously differentiable, so by
fundamental theorem of calculus there exists λ∗ ∈ (0, 1) (choosing strictly an interior point on the
line segment from a0 to a1) such that
0 ≤ f ′(λ)
∣∣∣
λ∗
(14)
Then we get the following:
0 ≤ f ′(λ)
∣∣∣
λ∗
=
[
∂U ′
∂λ
(aλ
∗
)
]⊤
· (a1 − a0)
=
[
∂U ′1
∂λ
(aλ
∗
),
∂U ′2
∂λ
(aλ
∗
), . . . ,
∂U ′n
∂λ
(aλ
∗
)
]⊤
· (a1 − a0)
=

∑
j
∂U ′1
∂aλj
·
∂aλj
∂λ
(aλ
∗
), . . . ,
∑
j
∂U ′n
∂aλj
·
∂aλj
∂λ
(aλ
∗
)


⊤
· (a1 − a0)
= (a1 − a0)⊤ · M¯ · (a1 − a0)
14 Combining terms in equation line (13) would give us
0 = f(1) − f(0) =
([
U
′(a1)
]
−
[
U
′(a0)
])⊤
· (a1 − a0)
Rosen defines the following property which here is trivially sufficient to guarantee uniqueness of pure Nash equilibrium.
(If Definition 4 holds everywhere, then in particular it holds for a0,a1 and it would give an immediate contradiction
at this point of the analysis.) Also see Theorem 2.
Definition 4. Given domain Ω ⊆ Rn, a function f : Ω → Rn with pseudogradient f ′(ω) =
[
∂f
∂ωi
]
i
is diagonally
strictly concave if for every distinct ω0,ω1 ∈ Ω, it has
[
f
′(ω1)− f
′(ω0)
]⊤
· (ω1 − ω0) < 0
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by
∂aλj
∂λ (a
λ∗) = (a1j − a
0
j ) and letting M¯ be the matrix where the (i, j) entry is
∂U ′i
∂aλj
(aλ
∗
)
But then M¯ is observed to be exactly JpgU the Jacobian matrix of the pseudogradient ofU evaluated
at aλ
∗
. Substituting back and summarizing we get
0 ≤ (a1 − a0)⊤ · JpgU (a
λ∗) · (a1 − a0) ≤ 0 (15)
with the left hand side from the previous block of analysis, and the right hand side by assumption
of interior negative definiteness (in the theorem statement). Clearly the middle term must be
identically 0. The final step of our proof will be to use the technical definition of interior negative
definiteness to show that it actually implies that the right hand inequality is strict (contradicting
that it must hold with equality from line (15)).
By our starting assertion, a0 and a1 are distinct such that z = (a1 − a0) is a non-zero vector,
and now equation (15) can be interpreted as a test of negative definiteness of U ′ at aλ
∗
, by the
definition that for negative definite matrix M , it has z⊤Mz < 0, ∀ z 6= 0.
For clarity we rewrite equation (15) (incorporating that it holds with equality from above):
f ′(λ)
∣∣∣
λ∗
= (a1 − a0)⊤ · JpgU (a
λ∗) · (a1 − a0) = 0 (16)
If our assumption was that we had strict negative definiteness everywhere, this would already
be a contradiction.15 Within the assumption of interior negative definiteness, the only possible way
that we do not have strict negative definiteness is if the point aλ
∗
is on one or more of the action
boundaries. It is a strict convex combination of a0 and a1, so it can only be on the boundary for
some coordinate j if both a0j and a
1
j are both originally in the same j-dimension boundary.
For all dimensions j for which aλ
∗
is in a boundary (recall the set C(a) defined from the theorem
statement, let it again represent the set of such j), it must be that zj = (a
1
j − a
0
j) = 0.
Removing quantities that must multiply out to 0 from equation (16), because of the 0-vector-
coordinate and regardless of the entries of the matrix, effectively taking a minor, we can re-write
it as a reduced equation
(a1−C. − a
0
C.)
⊤ · JpgU−C.(a
λ∗
−C.) · (a
1
−C. − a
0
−C.) = 0 (17)
where a vector with subscript (−C.) removes the dimensions represented in set C(a), and where
the matrix JpgU−C. (note the dependence on a
λ∗) was analogously defined in the theorem statement
where it was further assumed to be strictly negative definite.
But then the non-zero vector z−C. = (a
1
−C.−a
0
C.) gives us a final contradiction of the assumption
of JpgU−C. as strictly negative definite, as seen in equation (17). We conclude that distinct pure Nash
equilibria a0 and a1 can not exist with the conditions on U as given in the theorem statement.
15At this point we have proved Rosen’s Lemma 1, which claimed that strict negative definiteness of U ′ was sufficient
for diagonal strict concavity, and hence uniqueness of Nash.
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A.2 Derivative Calculations for Section 3.2
Allocation rule sub-calculations:
xi(w) =
wi∑
k wk
∂xi
∂wi
(w) =
(
∑
k wk)− wi
(
∑
k wk)
2
∂xi
∂wj
(w) =
−wi
(
∑
k wk)
2 =
−xi(w)∑
k wk
Re-stating the bid function:
πi(w) = vi(wi)−
∫ wi
wi(0)
xi(z,w−i)v
′
i(z)dz
xi(w)
Self-partial:
∂πi
∂wi
(w) = v′i(wi)−
xi(w)v
′
i(wi)
xi(w)
+
∫ wi
wi(0)
xi(z,w−i)v
′
i(z)dz ·
∂xi
∂wi
(w)
x2i (w)
=
∫ wi
wi(0)
xi(z,w−i)v
′
i(z)dz ·
∂xi
∂wi
(w)
x2i (w)
=
∫ wi
wi(0)
xi(z,w−i)v
′
i(z)dz ·
(
∑
k wk)−wi
(
∑
k wk)
2(
wi∑
k wk
)2
=
∫ wi
wi(0)
xi(z,w−i)v
′
i(z)
[
(
∑
k wk)− wi
w2i
]
dz
=
∫ wi
wi(0)
v′i(z)
1
wi
·
z
(
∑
k wk)− wi + z
·
[∑
k wk
wi
− 1
]
dz
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Cross-partials:
∂πi
∂wj
(w) = −
∫ wi
wi(0)
∂xi
∂wj
(z,w−i)v
′
i(z)dz
xi(w)
+
∂xi
∂wj
(w)
∫ wi
wi(0)
xi(z,w−i)v
′
i(z)dz
x2i (w)
=
∫ wi
wi(0)
v′i(z) ·
[
xi(z,w−i)
∂xi
∂wj
(w)− ∂xi∂wj (z,w−i)xi(w)
]
dz
x2i (w)
=
∫ wi
wi(0)
v′i(z) ·
[
xi(z,w−i)
−xi(w)∑
k wk
− −xi(z,w−i)
(
∑
k wk)−wi+z
xi(w)
]
dz
x2i (w)
=
∫ wi
wi(0)
v′i(z) ·
[
xi(z,w−i)
−1∑
k wk
+ xi(z,w−i)
(
∑
k wk)−wi+z
]
dz
wi∑
k wk
=
∫ wi
wi(0)
v′i(z)
1
wi
·
[
−z
(
∑
k wk)−wi + z
+
z
((
∑
k wk)− wi + z)
2
·
∑
k
wk
]
dz
=
∫ wi
wi(0)
v′i(z)
1
wi
·
z
(
∑
k wk)− wi + z
·
[ ∑
k wk
(
∑
k wk)− wi + z
− 1
]
dz
A.3 Proof of Lemma 2
Lemma 2. Given the price function pi for proportional weights, for j, k 6= i, the cross derivatives
are the same: ∂pii∂wj =
∂pii
∂wk
. Evaluating the Jacobian at w, further, all elements of the Jacobian
matrix Jpi are positive, i.e.,
∂pii
∂wi
> 0, ∂pii∂wj > 0, except at the wi(0) lower boundary in dimension i
where the elements of row i are ∂pii∂wi =
∂pii
∂wj
= 0.
Proof. All cross-derivatives ∂pii∂wj for fixed i and j 6= i are equal because a dwj increase in the weight
of any other agent j “looks the same” mathematically to the proportional weights allocation rule
of agent i, which is xi(wi) =
wi
wi+
∑
j 6=i wj
.
We continue by recalling our assumption that weights are strictly positive and strictly increasing
in value. Then all terms in the derivative equations (7) and (8) within the integrals are non-negative
everywhere by inspection. All denominator terms are strictly positive everywhere.
For any dimension i, consider wi > wi(0). For integrand z strictly interior to the endpoints
in (wi(0), wi), all terms in the derivative equations are strictly positive everywhere. With non-
negativity everywhere and positivity somewhere, all derivatives evaluate to be strictly positive.
For wi = wi(0), the integrals start and end at wi(0) and trivially evaluate to 0.
A.4 Proof of Theorem 6 in Section 3.2
Theorem 6. Consider a matrix G with diagonal g1, g2, . . . , gn and all other entries equal to 1 (and
without loss of generality g1 ≤ g2 ≤ . . . ≤ gn). The following is a complete characterization of when
G is positive definite.
1. if g1 ≤ 0, then the matrix G is not positive definite;
2. if g1 ≥ 1 and g2 > 1, then G is positive definite;
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3. if g1, g2 ≤ 1, then G is not positive definite;
4. if 0 < g1 < 1 and g2 > 1, then G is positive definite if and only if
∑
k
1
1−gk
> 1.
Proof. To prove positive definiteness in cases (2) and (4), we will show that for any non-zero vector
z, it must be true that z⊤G z > 0. For cases (1) and (3) we give counterexamples of z for which
z⊤G z ≤ 0. Given the structure of G, we have
z⊤G z =
(∑
i
zi
)2
+
∑
i
(gi − 1)z
2
i . (18)
We recall for use throughout this proof the assumption that, without loss of generality, the
diagonal elements are such that g1 ≤ g2 ≤ . . . ≤ gn. We prove each case of the characterization in
turn.
Case (1) is correct by counter-example, setting z = (−1, 0, . . . , 0).16
Case (2) is correct by inspection of equation (18) in which all terms are non-negative. The
vector z is non-zero, so either a (gj − 1)z
2
j term for j 6= 1 in the second sum is strictly larger than
0, or all such zj are 0 but then z1 6= 0 and the first sum-squared is strictly larger than 0.
Case (3) is correct by counter-example, setting z = (1,−1, 0, . . . , 0).
For case (4), we need to prove that when 0 < g1 < 1 and g2 > 1, then the matrix G is positive
definite if and only if
∑
k
1
1−gk
> 1.
For this last case, given the assumptions on the gi elements, only the (g1 − 1)z
2
1 term from
equation (18) is negative, all other terms are non-negative. Therefore, from this point on, we can
ignore any sub-case where z1 = 0, as some (gj − 1)z
2
j term for j 6= 1 must be strictly positive.
Now consider fixing the value z1 to any real number z¯1 6= 0. We will show that equation (18)
is strictly positive for any z−1 ∈ R
n−1. Specifically, for any z¯1 6= 0, equation (18) has a global
minimum in variables z−1 that is strictly positive. This global minimum z
∗
−1 satisfies
z∗−1 = argminz−1(z¯1, z−1)
⊤ ·G · (z¯1, z−1) (19)
= argmin
z−1
(
z¯1 +
∑
j≥2
zj
)2
+
∑
j≥2
(gj − 1)z
2
j (20)
where the second line substitutes equation (18) and drops the constant z¯1 term from the right hand
sum. It will be convenient to denote the sum of the variables as S(z¯1) = z¯1 +
∑
i≥2 z
∗
i . After the
brief argument that the minimizer z∗−1 exists and is characterized by its first-order conditions, we
will use first-order conditions on z∗−1 to write all variables in terms of S(z¯1) which we substitute
into (18) to analyze.
To show that z∗−1 exists and is characterized by its first-order conditions, observe that the
polynomial (z¯1, z−1)
⊤G (z¯1, z−1) is a quadratic form with Hessian 2 ·G[2:n,2:n], i.e., twice the matrix
G without the first row and column:
Hessian((z¯1, z−1)
⊤G (z¯1, z−1)) = G[2:n,2:n] =


g2 1 . . . 1
1 g3 . . . 1
...
...
. . .
...
1 1 . . . gn

 .
16Of course, it is a well-known property of positive definite matrices G that all diagonal elements must be strictly
positive, otherwise they have z⊤G z ≤ 0 with a simple counter-example z described by all zeroes except −1 in the
index of the matrix’s non-positive diagonal element.
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Matrix G[2:n,2:n] is ones except by assumption we have gj > 1 for j ≥ 2 in the diagonal; thus,
by case (2) of the theorem, it is positive definite. A quadratic form with strictly positive definite
Hessian has a unique local minimum which is characterized by its first-order conditions.
We now use the first-order conditions to write optimizer z∗−1 of equation (20) in terms of S(z¯1).
0 = 2
(
z¯1 +
(∑
k≥2,k 6=j
z∗k
)
+ (gj − 1) · z
∗
j
)
for each j ≥ 2 (21)
z∗j =
1
1− gj
S(z¯1) for each j ≥ 2 (22)
We now similarly identify a substitution of z¯1 in terms of S(z¯1). Starting from equation (22),
sum the z∗j first-order condition equalities over all j ≥ 2:
∑
j≥2
z∗j =
∑
j≥2
(
1
1− gj
S(z¯1)
)
(23)
Add z¯1 to both sides of the equation:
1 ·
(
z¯1 +
∑
j≥2
z∗j
)
= z¯1 +
(∑
j≥2
1
1− gj
)
S(z¯1) (24)
Substitute S(z¯1) on the left and solve for the right-hand side z¯1 term:
z¯1 =
(
1−
∑
j≥2
1
1− gj
)
· S(z¯1). (25)
Notice that equation (25) and the definition of z¯1 6= 0 excludes the possibility that S(z¯1) = 0.
In the analysis below, the first line re-writes the objective function in (18). The second line
substitutes equations (22) and (25). Subsequent lines are elementary manipulations.
(z¯1, z
∗
−1)
⊤ ·G · (z¯1, z
∗
−1)
= (g1 − 1) z¯1 + S(z¯1)
2 +
∑
j≥2
(gj − 1) z
∗
j
= (g1 − 1)

1−∑
j≥2
1
1− gj


2
S(z¯1)
2 +

1−∑
j≥2
1
1− gj

S(z¯1)2
= S(z¯1)
2

(g1 − 1)

1−∑
j≥2
1
1− gj


2
+ 1−
∑
j≥2
1
1− gj


= S(z¯1)
2

1−∑
j≥2
1
1− gj



(1− g1)

∑
j≥2
1
1− gj
− 1

+ 1− g1
1− g1


= S(z¯1)
2
(
1−
∑
j≥2
1
1− gj
)
(1− g1)
[∑
k
1
1− gk
− 1
]
.
Given the assumptions on the gi for current case (4), the first three terms of this product are
strictly positive (recalling z¯1 6= 0 and S(z¯1) 6= 0, so (S(z¯1))
2 > 0). To finish, we observe that the
21
exact dependence of positive definiteness of the matrix G is on the bracketed fourth term (where
the first term k = 1 of the sum is positive and all of the other terms are negative):
For 0 < g1 < 1 and gj > 1 ∀j ≥ 2, G is positive definite iff
[∑
k
1
1−gk
− 1
]
> 0.
A.5 Lemmas Supporting Theorem 7 in Section 3.2
Lemma 3. If hi ≤ 1, then wi > 0.5
∑
k wk, and all other weights must have wj < 0.5
∑
k wk, and
all other hj > 1.
Proof. Writing out hi from its definition as the ratio of partial derivatives,
hi =
∫ wi
wi(0)
v′i(z)
1
wi
· z∑
k wk−wi+z
·
[∑
k wk
wi
− 1
]
dz∫ wi
wi(0)
v′i(z)
1
wi
· z∑
k wk−wi+z
·
[ ∑
k wk∑
k wk−wi+z
− 1
]
dz
If hi ≤ 1, by implication it is well-defined so the denominator can not disappear and wi > wi(0).
There must exist z ∈ (0, wi], such that
∑
k wk∑
k wk − wi + z
≥
∑
k wk
wi
(26)
which implies wi > 0.5
∑
k wk by noting equal numerators and comparison of denominators. The
rest of the claim follows as wi is obviously the only weight more than half the total, and claiming
hj > 1 for other j is simply an explicit statement of the contrapositive.
We give the necessary and sufficient lower bound for each term in the final equation (A.4) that
will appear in the proof of Theorem 7.
Lemma 4. When h1 < 1 and hj > 1 ∀j 6= 1, we have
∑
k
1
1−hk
> 1.
Proof. With h1 < 1 by assumption, then w1 > 0.5
∑
k wk by Lemma 3, and x1 > 0.5. Thus xj < 0.5
for j 6= 1 and we can apply Lemma 8 (below), to get the first inequality in the following analysis:
∑
k
1
1− hk
>
x21
2x1 − 1
+
∑
k>1
x2k
2xk − 1
≥
x21
2x1 − 1
+
(1− x1)
2
2(1 − x1)− 1
= 1
and with the second step following because
x2
k
2xk−1
∣∣∣
0
= 0 and is a concave function when 0 < xk < 0.5
and
∑
k>1 xk = (1− x1) (its second derivative is
2
(2xk−1)3
and it acts submodular).
Lemma 8. When h1 < 1 and hj > 1 ∀j 6= 1, then ∀ i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, we have
1
1−hi
>
x2i
2xi−1
.
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Proof. By subtracting 1 from both sides, it is equivalent to prove the inequality on the right:
1
1− hi
>
x2i
2xi − 1
⇐⇒
hi
1− hi
>
x2i − 2xi + 1
2xi − 1
=
(1− xi)
2
2xi − 1
Working from the definition of hi:
hi
1− hi
=
∫ wi
wi(0)
v′i(z)
1
wi
· z∑
k wk−wi+z
·
[∑
k wk
wi
− 1
]
dz∫ wi
wi(0)
v′i(z)
1
wi
· z∑
k wk−wi+z
·
[ ∑
k wk∑
k wk−wi+z
−
∑
k wk
wi
]
dz
The numerator is always positive.
For the denominator, we would like to get a less complex upper bound on it by dropping the z
term within the brackets. Generally we can do this but we have to be careful that the overall sign
of the denominator does not change.
For i 6= 1 and hi > 1, then the denominator is negative by simple inspection of the left hand
side. For i = 1, h1 < 1, then the denominator is positive. We relax the denominator and increase
it, arguing after the calculations that doing this does not change the sign of the expression.∫ wi
wi(0)
v′i(z)
1
wi
·
z∑
k wk − wi + z
·
[ ∑
k wk∑
k wk − wi + z
−
∑
k wk
wi
]
dz
<
∫ wi
wi(0)
v′i(z)
1
wi
·
z∑
k wk − wi + z
·
[ ∑
k wk∑
k wk − wi
−
∑
k wk
wi
]
dz
=
∫ wi
wi(0)
v′i(z)
1
wi
·
z∑
k wk − wi + z
·
[
(
∑
k wk) (2wi −
∑
k wk)
wi (
∑
k wk − wi)
]
dz
The important term is (2wi −
∑
k wk). For i = 1, w1 > 0.5
∑
k wk by Lemma 3, and also for j 6= 1,
wj < 0.5
∑
k wk by Lemma 3. Then clearly the denominator is still positive for i = 1; and still
negative for agents i 6= 1. So we give a lower bound on the fraction using the proved upper bound
on the denominator.
hi
1− hi
>
∫ wi
wi(0)
v′i(z)
1
wi
· z∑
k wk−wi+z
·
[∑
k wk
wi
− 1
]
dz∫ wi
wi(0)
v′i(z)
1
wi
· z∑
k wk−wi+z
·
[ ∑
k wk∑
k wk−wi
−
∑
k wk
wi
]
dz
=
∑
k wk
wi
− 1
∑
k wk∑
k wk−wi
−
∑
k wk
wi
=
(1− xi)
2
2xi − 1
B Supporting Material for Section 4
The goal of this section is to show in detail how to reduce the price inversion question to binary
search. We do this by showing that the analysis is largely many-to-one separable: we can make
meaningful observations about each agent individually, in particular by treating the (initially un-
known) sum total of all weights s =
∑
k wk as an independent variable used as input to the analysis
of each agent.
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Before getting to the key results, we use a more measured pace than is possible in the main
body of the paper to give some preliminary analysis of the problem regarding price functions and
structure of search spaces, in particular for “small” agents with weight at most half the total. We
do this in Appendix B.1 and then the rest of this section is laid out as follows: Appendix B.2 gives
both the intuition and fully detailed version of the algorithm; Appendix B.3 gives the proofs of
the critical lemmas and Theorem 8 from Section 4; and finally technical Appendix B.4 is used to
describe within the algorithm how we set up the “oracle checks” to find the correct sub-space of
value space to search for a solution, and the endpoints of binary search.
B.1 First Computations and Analysis of the Search Space
This section exhibits the fundamentals of a reduced, separated, one-agent analysis of the price in-
version question, starting with some analysis. Note the following explicit conversion of the function
πi(.) to accept sum s =
∑
k wk as an input variable in place of w−i. We recall equation (6):
πi(w) = vi(wi)−
∫ wi
wi(0)
xi(z,w−i)v
′
i(z)dz
xi(w)
where we also recall vi(·) is overloaded to be the function that maps from buyer i’s weight back to
buyer i’s valuation (well-defined by the assumption that wi(·) is strictly increasing). Re-arranging
we have:
π¯i(s,wi) = vi(wi)−
s
wi
∫ wi
wi(0)
z
s− wi + z
v′i(z)dz (27)
The form of equation (27) illustrates the critical relationships between π¯i, s, and wi. Our high
level goal will be to understand the behavior of the function π¯i in the space ranging over feasible s
and wi, starting with the technical computations of the partials on π¯i. Recall from Lemma 2 that
functions πi have the same cross-partials with respect to wj ∀ j 6= i. This property extends to π¯i:
π¯i(s+ dwi, wi + dwi) = πi(wi + dwi,w−i)
⇒ ∂p¯ii∂s dwi +
∂p¯ii
∂wi
dwi =
∂pii
∂wi
dwi
π¯i(s,wi + dwi) = πi(wi + dwi, wj − dwi,w−i,j)
⇒ ∂p¯ii∂widwi =
∂pii
∂wi
dwi −
∂pii
∂wj
dwi
Combining the above equations together, and any j 6= i we get
∂π¯i
∂wi
=
∂πi
∂wi
−
∂πi
∂wj
(28)
∂π¯i
∂s
=
∂πi
∂wj
(29)
We give the intuition for these calculations. If wi increases unilaterally without a change in s,
then it must be that some other wj decreases by an equal amount. If we increase s without an
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observed change in wi, then it must be some other wj that increased.
17 The result is the symbolic
identities as given in equations (28) and (29) above. We will evaluate them in more detail in
Lemma 9 below.
We formally identify three objects of interest (initially discussed in Section 4, see Figure 3).
These quantities are defined for each agent i, weight function wi, and the observed price ρi of
this agent. Importantly, though the notation includes the whole profile of observed prices ρ, these
objects only depend on its ith coordinate ρi.
• First, the price level set Qρi is defined as {(s,wi) | π¯i(s,wi) = ρi}, i.e., these are the ρi level-
sets of π¯i(s,wi). Its pertinent subset is P
ρ
i = {(s,wi) | π¯i(s,wi) = ρi and wi ≤ s/2} ⊆ Q
ρ
i ,
i.e., the subset which restricts the set Qρi to the region where wi is at most half the total
weight s.18 These sets are illustrated respectively by the dashed and solid lines in Figure 3.
• Second, the elements of the price level-set Pρi each have unique s coordinate (see Lemma 9).
It will be convenient to describe it as a function mapping sum s to weight wi of agent i,
parameterized by the price ρi. Denote this function w
ρ
i (s). This function is illustrated in
Figure 3 where below the dotted line wi = s/2, the curve is a function in s. Qualitatively, it
is monotone decreasing and not necessarily convex.
• Third, Pρi is non-empty and possesses a smallest total weights coordinate s which we define
as rρi = min{s : (s,wi) ∈ P
ρ
i }. In the example of Figure 3, r
ρ
i is the s-coordinate of the point
where the level-set Pρi intersects the wi = s/2 line. In the case that the entire set Q
ρ
i is below
the wi = s/2 line, P
ρ
i = Q
ρ
i and r
ρ
i is the sum s that uniquely satisfies π¯i(s,wi(h)) = ρi.
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Continuing, consider price level set Qρi . We note again that π¯i(·) can be used to map a domain of
(s,wi) to price level sets (as depicted in Figure 3). In this context we return to analyzing the partial
derivatives of π¯i(·), formally with Lemma 9 (immediately to follow). Intuitively, the statement of
Lemma 9 claims the following, with relation to Figure 3:
• Part 1 of Lemma 9: below the wi = s/2 line, starting at any point (sˆ, wˆi), we strictly “move
up” fixed-price level sets as we move up to (sˆ, wˆi + δ), or to the right to (sˆ + δ, wˆi).
• Part 2 of Lemma 9: below the wi = s/2 line, price level sets are necessarily decreasing curves;
further they are defined for arbitrarily large s, which reflects the many-to-one nature of this
analysis: other than the summary statistic s, nothing specific is known about the other agents,
for example we do not need to know the number of other agents or their weights functions or
bounds on their weights.
• Additionally, above the wi = s/2 line, we “move up” fixed-price level sets with an increase in
s but not necessarily with an increase in wi.
For use in Lemma 9 and the rest of this section, we overload the notation hi as defined in
equation (9) to be a function of wi and s rather than w, with the obvious substitution in its
definition to replace
∑
k wk with s.
17Note that because all the cross-derivatives are the same, it is without loss of generality that we assume that
changes ∂s are entirely attributable to one other particular agent j 6= i as ∂wj .
18We can not assume that the set Pρi is non-empty without proof. We prove that it is non-empty in Lemma 12.
19Further discussion will be given in Appendix B.4 where we show that rρi can be computed via a binary search
between easy to identify upper and lower bounds.
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swi
rρi
wi(h)
wi(0)
s s/2
Qρi
Pρi
Figure 3: The price level set curve Qρi = {(s,wi) : π¯i(s,wi) = ρi} (thick, gray, dashed), is decreasing
below the wi = s/2 line (Lemma 6) where it is defined by its subset P
ρ
i (thin, black, solid). It is
bounded above by the wi = s line (trivially as s sums over all weights) and the wi = wi(h) line (the
maximum weight in the support of the values), and below by the wi = wi(0) line which we have
assumed to be strictly positive. rρi is the minimum weight-sum consistent with observed price ρi
and weights wi ≤ s/2. This is an exact replica of Figure 2, copied here for convenience.
Lemma 9. Assume wi ≤ s/2 and fix the price of agent i to be ρi > 0. Let Q
ρ
i , P
ρ
i , w
ρ
i (s) and r
ρ
i
be defined as above, and hi =
∂pii
∂wi
/ ∂pii∂wj as defined in equation (9). Then restricting analysis to the
cone described by wi ≤ s/2 and non-negative weight wi:
1. π¯i(s,wi) is a continuous and strictly increasing function in both variables s and wi, with
specifically ∂p¯ii(s,wi)∂s =
∂pii
∂wj
and ∂p¯ii(s,wi)∂wi =
∂pii
∂wj
· (hi − 1);
2. wρi (s) is a well-defined and strictly decreasing function on s ∈ [r
ρ
i ,∞) with
dwρi (s)
ds =
1
1−hi
;
in particular the function is well-defined for arbitrarily large s independent of the number of
other agents or their weight functions;
3. wρi (s) can be computed to arbitrary precision using binary search.
Further, (1) partially extends such that π¯i(s,wi) is increasing in s with
∂p¯ii(s,wi)
∂s =
∂pii
∂wj
holding
everywhere, (so including above the line wi = s/2).
Proof. For (1), as in Section 3.2, we set hi =
∂pii
∂wi
/ ∂pii∂wj , i.e., the diagonal entry in the Jacobian
matrix after the normalization (divide each row by its common cross-partial term), and with the
substitution s =
∑
k wk.
From equation (28), ∂p¯ii∂wi =
∂pii
∂wi
− ∂pii∂wj =
∂pii
∂wj
· (hi − 1). By Lemma 3, hi is larger than 1 when
wi ≤ s/2. By Lemma 2,
∂pii
∂wj
> 0. Hence ∂pii∂wj · (hi − 1) > 0 when wi ≤ s/2. The
∂p¯ii
∂s direction
follows directly from equation (29) with Lemma 2 applying to ∂pii∂wj . This argument is also sufficient
to prove the last claim of the lemma statement extending (1).
For (2), we first observe that the function wρi (s) is well-defined (on an appropriate domain)
because wρi (s) uses fixed ρi, otherwise it would contradict the monotonicity properties proved in
(1) which requires we “move up” price level sets whenever we unilaterally increase wi. Therefore
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we can take the derivative with respect to s. We get
dwρi (s)
ds is negative for wi ≤ s/2 by the following
calculation (from first-order conditions as we move along the fixed curve resulting from π¯i(·) having
constant output ρi):
0 =
∂π¯i
∂wρi (s)
dwρi (s) +
∂π¯i
∂s
ds
⇒
dwρi (s)
ds
=
−∂p¯ii∂s
∂p¯ii
∂wρi (s)
= −
∂pii
∂wj
∂pii
∂wi
− ∂pii∂wj
=
1
1− hi
< 0
The last inequality uses Lemma 3 from which wi ≤ s/2 implies hi > 1. We next prove for (2) that
wρi (·) and its domain are well-defined.
Technical Lemma 12 (below) will show that Pρi is non-empty. Consider starting at any of its
elements. We can theoretically use its continuous derivative to “trace out” the curve of the function
wρi (s). As s increases from the starting point, we note that positive prices can never be consistent
with non-positive weights, then the continuous and negative derivative implies that the function
converges to some positive infimum as s → ∞. As s decreases, the function increases until either
we reach a maximum feasible point with (s,wρi (s) = wi(h)) from the maximum value type h, or
otherwise the input-output pair (s,wρi (s)) intersects the line wi = s/2, and minimum total weight
rρi is realized at the point of intersection.
This shows that “reals at least rρi ” is a valid domain for w
ρ
i (s), and this completes the first
statement in (2). The second statement of (2) follows because the construction of the set Qρi is
independent of other agents: for any realization of the set of other agents, their effect is summarized
with the variable s.
For (3), we note that the output of function wρi (s) has constant lower-bound wi(0) and is
upper-bounded by s/2, so we can indeed run binary search.
Within Lemma 9 we make a final note of the significance of the hi terms in derivative calcu-
lations. As the last part of the statement shows, these derivative calculations also hold for the
space wi > s/2 (with a carefully extended interpretation of the w
ρ
i function to be sure to apply the
mapping from s at the correct wi); but we do not get the contrapositive of Lemma 3 in this region
to guarantee the sign of (1− hi), and do not get the a monotonicity property of (2) everywhere.
Further, recall the statement of Lemma 4 (its proof was on page 22):
Lemma 4. When h1 < 1 and hj > 1 ∀j 6= 1, we have
∑
k
1
1−hk
> 1.
As economic intuition for this result, we now see that the terms in the sum are exactly the
derivatives ∂p¯ii(s,wi)∂s , i.e., the derivatives of the respective agents’ ρi level set curves. We will see
the importance of Lemma 4 below as the key final step in the proof of Lemma 7.
B.2 The Full Algorithm
Because the observed profile of prices ρ is invertible to a unique profile of weights (from Section 3.2),
the quantity s =
∑
k wk is uniquely determined by observed prices. The intuitive description of the
algorithmic strategy to compute the inversion from prices to weights is as follows.
Motivated by Appendix B.1, we intend to split the search space for the unique s. Clearly at
most one of the agents can have strictly more than half the weight. We cover the valuation space
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by considering n subspaces, representing the n possibilities that any one agent i∗ is allowed but not
required to have strictly more than half the weight. (The region where all agents have at most half
the weight is covered by all subspaces, without introducing a conflict.) Explicitly, define
Space-i =
{
w | wi unrestricted ∧ wj ≤
∑
k
wk/2, ∀ j 6= i
}
for i ∈ {1, . . . , n} (30)
A specific monotonicity property within each Space-i (see Lemma 7 and its proof) will allow
the algorithm to use a natural binary search for the solution. Considering such a search in each of
n spaces will deterministically find s˜ to yield a vector of weights w˜ as ((s˜−
∑
i 6=i∗ w¯i(s˜)),w
ρ
−i(s˜)),
which are arbitrarily close to the true s∗ and true w∗ consistent with ρ (i.e., pi maps w∗ to ρ).
We recall the definition of πρi∗ given previously in the main body of the paper, and extend it in
terms of π¯i∗ :
πρi∗(s) := πi∗(max{s −
∑
i 6=i∗
wρi (s), wi∗(0)},w
ρ
−i∗(s)) (11)
= π¯i∗(s,max{s−
∑
i 6=i∗
wρi (s), wi∗(0)}) (31)
Intuitively the definition here is: given s, we assign guesses of weights wρj (s) to other agents j
and agent i∗ gets weight as the balance s −
∑
j 6=i∗ w
ρ
j (s), then we calculate the price charged to
agent i∗ (simply from Myerson’s characterization).
The goal of the algorithm is to find the agent i∗ and unique s such that πρi∗(s) outputs ρi∗ , the
true payment. I.e., we search for the equality of πρi∗(s) = ρi∗ .
We now give the full version of the algorithm. Beyond the outline in the main body of the paper,
the new key technical piece in the expanded description is the use of rρj variables to lower bound
the search for s in any given candidate Space-i. The rρj variables were described as the third item
of interest in Appendix B.1. They are used in the expanded descriptions of new pre-process step 0,
and steps 1(a)(b)(c). We also newly use s(h) =
∑
k wk(h) to denote the maximum sum of weights
possible.
The full algorithm (with intuitive remarks):
0. Pre-process: For each i, compute rρi :
20
(a) (general case: Pρi 6= Q
ρ
i ) if π¯i(2wi(h), wi(h)) ≥ ρi, run binary search “diagonally” on
the line segment of wi = s/2 between (0, 0) and (2wi(h), wi(h)) to find an element of Q
ρ
i
and use its s coordinate as rρi (which we can do because π¯i(·) is strictly increasing on
this domain);
(b) (edge case: Pρi = Q
ρ
i ) otherwise, fix wi coordinate to its maximum wi(h) and run binary
search “horizontally” to find sˆ ∈ [2wi(h), s(h)] representing (sˆ, wi(h)) ∈ Q
ρ
i (which we
can do because π¯i(·) is strictly increasing in s for constant wi); set minimum total weight
rρi = sˆ.
1. find an agent i∗ and search a range [sL, sH ] over possible s by iteratively running the following
for each fixed assignment of agent i ∈ {1, . . . , n}:
(a) temporarily set i∗ = i;
20See Appendix B.4 for further explanation.
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(b) determine the range [sL, sH ] on which π
ρ
i∗ is well-defined and searching is appropriate:
• identify a candidate lower bound sL = maxj 6=i∗ r
ρ
j (because any smaller s ∈ [0, sL)
is outside the domain of wρj , for some j);
• run an “oracle check” on the lower bound, specifically, exit this iteration of the
for-loop if we do not observe:
πρi∗(sL) = π¯i∗(max{sL −
∑
k 6=i∗
wρk (sL), wi∗(0)}, sL) ≤ ρi∗
(because recall the goal of the algorithm, to search for equality of πρi∗(s) = ρi∗ ; but
by Lemma 9, πρi∗ is increasing, then if this does not hold at the lower bound, the
left hand side is already too big and will never decrease);
• identify a candidate upper bound sH using binary search to find sH as the largest
total weight consistent with the maximum weight of agent i∗, i.e, such that sH −∑
k 6=i∗ w
ρ
k (sH) = wi∗(h):
– search for sH ∈ [sL, s(h)] (s > sH will “guess” impossible weights wi∗ > wi∗(h)
as input to π¯i∗ , because wi∗ gets the balance of s after subtracting the decreasing
functions in
∑
k 6=i∗ wk(s), see Lemma 13);
• run an “oracle check” on the upper bound, specifically, exit this iteration of the
for-loop immediately after either of the following fail (in order):
wi∗(0) ≤ sH −
∑
k 6=i∗
πρk (sH)
ρi∗ ≤ π
ρ
i∗(sH) = π¯i∗(sH −
∑
k 6=i∗
wρk (sH), sH)
(with the first checking the rationality of the interim guess of weight wi∗ and the
second applying reasoning symmetric to the justification of the oracle on the lower
bound);
(c) permanently fix i∗ = i, sL, sH and break the for-loop (if this step is reached, then the
range [sL, sH ] over s is non-empty and contains a solution by passing both oracles);
2. use the monotonicity of πρi∗ to binary search on s for the true s
∗, converging πρi∗(s) to ρi∗ ;
3. when the binary search has been run to satisfactory precision and reached a final estimate s˜,
output weights w˜ = (s˜ −
∑
i 6=i∗ w
ρ
i (s˜),w
ρ
−i∗(s˜)) which invert to values v˜ via respective vi(·)
functions.
B.3 Proofs of Lemma 6, Lemma 7, and Theorem 8 (Algorithm Correctness)
We now prove the key lemmas claimed in the main body of the paper. The purpose of Lemma 6 is
to show that if we fix the “large weight candidate agent” i∗ putting us in Space-i∗, then all other
agents have weights that are a precise, monotonically decreasing function of s. Critically, recall
that we can set i∗ to be any agent, it is not restricted to be the agent (if any) who actually has
more than half the weight (according to the true weights of any specific problem instance).
Lemma 6. The price level set Qρi is a curve; further, restricting Q
ρ
i to the region wi ≤ s/2, the
resulting subset Pρi can be written as {(s,w
ρ
i (s)) : s ∈ [r
ρ
i ,∞)} for a real-valued decreasing function
wρi mapping sum s to a weight wi that is parameterized by the observed price ρi.
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Proof. This lemma follows as a special case of Lemma 9.
The purpose of Lemma 7 is to prove that function πρi∗ is monotone increasing in s within
Space-i∗; setting up our ability to identify end points sL and sH where we run oracle checks, and
our ability to run binary search for the unique solution s∗ in a correct space.
Lemma 7. For any agent i∗ and s ∈ [maxj 6=i∗ r
ρ
j ,∞), function π
ρ
i∗ is strictly increasing.
Proof. The quantity s−
∑
i 6=i∗ w
ρ
i (s) is monotone increasing in s as every term in the negated sum is
decreasing in s (Lemma 9). Therefore, the guess of weight wi∗ = max{s−
∑
i 6=i∗ w
ρ
i (s), wi∗(0)} lies in
one of two ranges that are delineated by the threshold where the increasing quantity s−
∑
i 6=i∗ w
ρ
i (s)
crosses the constant wi∗(0).
For small weight sums s, the guess wi∗ evaluates to wi∗(0). In this region π
ρ
i∗(s) = π¯i∗(s,wi∗(0))
from equation (31), and we know that πρi∗ is indeed strictly increasing in s when holding wi∗ = wi∗(0)
constant because ∂p¯ii∗(s,wi∗)∂s is strictly positive (Lemma 9).
The remainder of this proof is devoted to showing for large weight sums s where the guess wi∗
evaluates to s −
∑
i 6=i∗ w
ρ
i (s), that the function π
ρ
i∗(s) is strictly increasing. For the following, we
use the result of Lemma 3 and the definition of hi in equation (9). Note that when we are in
Space-i∗, we have hk > 1 for k 6= i
∗.
dπρi∗(s)
ds
=
dπi((s−
∑
k 6=iw
ρ
k (s)),w
ρ
−i(s))
ds
=
∂πi
∂wi

1−∑
k 6=i
dwρk (s)
ds

+ ∂πi
∂wj 6=i
∑
k 6=i
dwρk (s)
ds
=
∂πi
∂wi

1−∑
k 6=i
1
1− hk
+
1
hi
∑
k 6=i
1
1− hk


=
∂πi
∂wi

1 +( 1
hi
− 1
)∑
k 6=i
1
1− hk


In the second line here, the notation ∂pii∂wj 6=i recalls that all cross-partials are the same; moving from
the second line to the third line, we replaced
dwρ
k
(s)
ds = 1/(1 − hk) from Part 2 of Lemma 9, which
also guarantees that each of these terms is strictly negative. When hi ≥ 1, the total bracketed term
is positive, and
dpii((s−
∑
k 6=iw
ρ
k
(s)),wρ−i(s))
ds > 0.
Alternatively to make an argument when hi < 1, we further rearrange the algebra of the partial.
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Continuing from the last line:
dπρi∗(s)
ds
=
∂πi
∂wi

1 + ( 1
hi
− 1
)∑
k 6=i
1
1− hk


=
∂πi
∂wi

 1hi − 1
1
hi
− 1
+
(
1
hi
− 1
)∑
k 6=i
1
1− hk


=
∂πi
∂wi

( 1
hi
− 1
)

∑
k 6=i
1
1− hk

+ hi
1− hi
+
1
1− hi
−
1
1− hi




=
∂πi
∂wi
[(
1
hi
− 1
)((∑
k
1
1− hk
)
+
hi
1− hi
−
1
1− hi
)]
=
∂πi
∂wi
(
1
hi
− 1
)(∑
k
1
1− hk
− 1
)
When hi < 1, this quantity is again necessarily positive (with the last term positive by Lemma 4).
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So again
dpii((s−
∑
k 6=i w¯k(s)),w
ρ
−i(s))
ds > 0. We conclude that π
ρ
i∗(s) := πi((s −
∑
k 6=iw
ρ
k (s)),w
ρ
−i(s)) is
everywhere strictly increasing in s.
Finally we argue the correctness of the algorithm. However, correctness of the technical com-
putations in pre-processing step 0 will be delayed to Appendix B.4.
Theorem 8. Given weights w and payments ρ = pi(w) according to a proportional weights social
choice function, the algorithm identifies weights w˜ within ǫ of the true weights w in time polynomial
in the number of agents n, the logarithm of the ratio of high to low weights maxi ln(wi(h)/wi(0)),
and the logarithm of the desired precision ln 1/ǫ.
Proof. Fix observed prices ρ that correspond to true weights w with sum s =
∑
i wi. Fix an agent
i∗ with wi∗ > s/2 if one exists or i
∗ = 1 if none exists. Set sL = maxi 6=i∗ r
ρ
i , and sH as calculated
in the algorithm for Space-i∗. It must be that πρi∗(sL) ≤ ρi∗ ≤ π
ρ
i∗(sH). The bounds follow by
wi ≤ s/2 for all i 6= i
∗, and Lemma 12 and Lemma 13 (stated and proved in the next section).
Monotonicity of πρi∗(·) then implies binary search will identify a sum s˜ arbitrarily close to satisfying
πρi∗(s˜) = ρi∗ . By the definition of π
ρ
i (·), the weights w˜ = w
ρ(s˜) satisfy pi(w˜) ≈ ρ; by uniqueness of
the inverse pi−1, these weights are approximately the original weights, i.e., w˜ ≈ w.
In the case where wi∗ > s/2, the iterative searches of Space-i for i 6= i
∗ will fail as these
searches only consider points (s,wi∗) where wi∗ < s/2, but the weights w that corresponds to ρ are
unique (by Theorem 5) and do not satisfy wi∗ < s/2. When wi∗ ≤ s then all searches, in particular
i∗ = 1, will give the same result of w.
Lastly, we show that binary search over s-coordinates within Space-i∗ is sufficient to converge
the algorithm’s approximate w˜ to w (measured by L1-norm distance) at the same assymptotic rate
of the binary search on s, a rate which has only polynomial dependence on n, maxi ln(wi(h)/wi(0)),
and ln 1/ǫ.
21The significance of Lemma 4 here was discussed after the original statement of Lemma 7 at the end of Section 4.1,
and after Lemma 9 at the end of Appendix B.1.
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By Lemma 10 below, for each agent k 6= i∗ there is a bound Bk on the magnitude of the slope
of
∂piρi
∂s as a function of the value space and weight functions inputs to the problem. Bk depends on
the factor wi/wi(0) ≤ wi(h)/wi(0) leading to the running time dependence.
Given a binary-search-step range on s with size S, for every agent k 6= i∗, the size of the range
containing wk can not be larger than S · Bk. Every time the range of s gets cut in half, the upper
bound on the range of wk also gets cut in half. The convergence of w˜i∗ to wi∗ follows from the
convergence in coordinates s,w−i∗ and Lemma 11.
We conclude this section with the lemmas supporting the convergence rate claims of Theorem 8.
Within the statement of Lemma 10 recall that the definition of the derivative was proved by
Lemma 9.
Lemma 10. Given agent i with wi ≤ s/2 and function π
ρ
i , the slope
∂piρi
∂s =
1
1−hi
< 0 has magnitude
bounded by wi2wi(0) ≤
wi(h)
2wi(0)
.
Proof. We will show
∣∣ 1
1−hi
∣∣ ≤ wi2wi(0) . To upper bound ∣∣ 11−hi ∣∣, we lower bound hi > 1. Note that a
lower bound on hi will only be useful for us if it strictly separates hi above 1. Substitute s =
∑
k wk
into the definition of hi in equation (9) and bound, with justification to follow, as:
hi =
∫ wi
wi(0)
v′i(z)
1
wi
· zs−wi+z ·
[
s
wi
− 1
]
dz∫ wi
wi(0)
v′i(z)
1
wi
· zs−wi+z ·
[
s
s−wi+z
− 1
]
dz
≥
[
s
wi
− 1
]
[
s
s−wi+wi(0)
− 1
] ·
∫ wi
wi(0)
v′i(z)
1
wi
· zs−wi+zdz∫ wi
wi(0)
v′i(z)
1
wi
· zs−wi+zdz
≥
s−wi + wi(0)
wi − wi(0)
> 1 +
2wi(0)
wi
> 1
The first inequality replaces the integrand z in the bracketted term in the denominator with its
constant lower bound wi(0) (which only decreases a denominator, in the denominator); thereafter
both bracketted terms can be brought outside of their respective integrals. The second inequality
replaces the numerator with 1 because wi ≤ s/2 by statement assumption. The third (strict)
inequality both replaces s with 2wi by the same reason, and adds wi(0) to both numerator and
denominator, which makes the fraction smaller because it was originally larger than 1.
Using this bound we get:
∣∣∣∣ 11− hi
∣∣∣∣ ≤
∣∣∣∣∣ 11− (1 + 2wi(0)wi
)
∣∣∣∣∣ = wi2wi(0) ≤
wi(h)
2wi(0)
Lemma 11. Given agent i∗, true s∗ ∈ [s−, s+], and true weights wk ∈
[
w−k , w
+
k
]
for agents k 6= i∗,
which induce the range for i∗’s weight of wi∗ ∈
[
s− −
∑
k 6=i∗ w
+
k , s
+ −
∑
k 6=i∗ w
−
k
]
. If the sizes of
the ranges [s−, s+] and
[
w−k , w
+
k
]
are each individually reduced by (at least) a constant factor α,
then the size of the range of wi∗ is also reduced by (at least) α.
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Proof. The statement follows immediately from the induced range of wi∗ . Its size is exactly equal
to the sum of the n other ranges, i.e.,∣∣∣∣ [s− −∑k 6=i∗ w+k , s+ −
∑
k 6=i∗
w−k
] ∣∣∣∣ =
∣∣∣∣ [s−, s+]
∣∣∣∣+ ∑
k 6=i∗
∣∣∣∣ [w−k , w+k ]
∣∣∣∣
B.4 Correctness of Algorithm Search End Points as Oracle Checks
This section has four purposes:
• analyze the structure of rρi corresponding to level set Q
ρ
i ;
• prove the correctness and run-time of the pre-process step 0 of the algorithm, which pre-
computes rρi for all i;
• conclude that the lower bounds sL of search in any given Space-i, determined within each
iteration of step 1 of the algorithm, are the correct lower bounds of feasibility;
• conclude that the upper bounds sH calculated within each iteration of step 1 are the correct
upper bounds of feasibility;
For strictly positive observed payment ρi > 0, the level set Q
ρ
i takes on the full range of weights
wi ∈ (wi(ρi), wi(h)] (the lower bound of wi(ρi) will not play an important role, our algorithms will
use the less restrictive bound of wi(0) instead). Our search for the minimum s-coordinate of P
ρ
i , i.e.,
rρi , which is the intersection of Q
ρ
i with the points below the wi = s/2 line is either on the wi = s/2
boundary or on the wi = wi(h) boundary. This follows because constrained to wi ≤ s/2 the level
set is given by a decreasing function (Lemma 6) and all level sets extend to s = ∞ (this second
fact is true, but will not need to be explicitly proven). The two cases are depicted in Figure 4. For
convenience, we restate the preprocessing step of the algorithm:
0. Pre-process: For each i, compute rρi :
(a) (general case: Pρi 6= Q
ρ
i ) if π¯i(2wi(h), wi(h)) ≥ ρi, run binary search “diagonally” on
the line segment of wi = s/2 between (0, 0) and (2wi(h), wi(h)) to find an element of Q
ρ
i
and use its s coordinate as rρi (which we can do because π¯i(·) is strictly increasing on
this domain);
(b) (edge case: Pρi = Q
ρ
i ) otherwise, fix wi coordinate to its maximum wi(h) and run binary
search “horizontally” to find sˆ ∈ [2wi(h), s(h)] representing (sˆ, wi(h)) ∈ Q
ρ
i (which we
can do because π¯i(·) is strictly increasing in s for constant wi); set minimum total weight
rρi = sˆ.
There is an intuitive explanation to the order of operations in the pre-processing step 0. First
we check if we are in the general case. We can do this because price level-sets are strictly increasing
on the line wi = s/2 (see Lemma 12 below, extending Lemma 9). So we can check the largest the
price at the largest possible point as π¯i(2wi(h), wi(h)); if it is too big, we can run binary search
down to π¯i(2wi(0), wi(0)) = 0; otherwise we are in the edge case where r
ρ
i corresponds to wi(h). In
this case, we can binary search the line wi = wi(h) for the point with payment ρi as, again, price
level-sets are strictly increasing (Lemma 9). The formal proof is given as Lemma 12.
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ρ
i
′
wi(h)
wi(0)
s s/2
Qρi
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Qρ
′
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′
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Figure 4: The cases for the initialization of lower bound rρi are depicted. When ρi = 0 both of the
corresponding price level sets Pi and Qi are on the line wi = wi(0) (depicted, but not labeled). For
observed price ρi ≤ π¯i(2wi(h), wi(h)) the intermediate level sets look like the depicted P
ρ
i 6= Q
ρ
i ,
and rρi corresponds to the s-coordinate at the intersection with the wi = s/2 line. For observed
price ρi ≥ π¯i(2wi(h), wi(h)) the high level sets look like the depicted P
ρ′
i = Q
ρ′
i , and r
ρ
i
′
corresponds
to the s-coordinate at the intersection with the wi = wi(h) line.
Lemma 12. For any realizable payment ρi, price level set P
ρ
i is non-empty and its s-coordinates
are lower bounded by rρi which can be computed to arbitrary precision by a binary search.
Proof. As mentioned previously, denote the maximum sum of weights possible by s(h) =
∑
iwi(h).
To find rρi , we first focus attention on the horizontal line with constant weight wi(h).
A point (sˆ, wi(h)) on price level set Q
ρ
i , i.e., with π¯i(sˆ, wi(h)) = ρi, can be found to arbitrary
precision with binary search over s ∈ (wi(h), s(h)]. Correctness of this binary search follows because
a realizable payment ρi must satisfy 0 = π¯i(wi(h), wi(h)) ≤ ρi ≤ π¯i(s(h), wi(h)) and because
increasing s-coordinate corresponds to increasing price-level set on any line with fixed weight wi by
Lemma 9. For the lower bound on the range, an agent wins with certainty and makes no payment
when the sum of the other agent weights is zero; the upper bound is from the natural upper bound
s ≤ s(h).
There are now two cases depending on whether this point (sˆ, wi(h)) is above or below the
wi = s/2 line.
22 If below, then rρi = sˆ because this point is tight to the maximum weight wi(h)
(see Figure 4), and (again by Lemma 9) the slope of curve Pρi is strictly negative and all smaller s
are infeasible.
Alternatively suppose (wi(h), sˆ) is above the wi = s/2 line, then r
ρ
i can be found by searching
the wi = s/2 line. Part (1) of Lemma 9 guarantees that points on this line are consistent with unique
and increasing observed prices (partials of the price function are strictly positive in both dimensions
wi and s, we can first move right ds, and then move up dwi, with the price function strictly increasing
as a result of both “moves”). On this line we have 0 = π¯i(2wi(0), wi(0)) ≤ ρi ≤ π¯i(2wi(h), wi(h))
where the lower bound observes an agent with value 0 to always pay 0, and the upper bound follows
from the supposition wi(h) ≥ sˆ/2 of this case. Thus, a binary search of the wi = s/2 line with
wi ∈ [wi(0), wi(h)] is guaranteed to find a point with price arbitrarily close to ρi. Since P
ρ
i as a
curve is decreasing in s, the identified point, which is in Pρi , has the minimum s-coordinate.
22If on the line, the cases are equal and either suffices.
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The two cases are exhaustive and so rρi is identified and P
ρ
i is non-empty.
We finish the section with the lemma showing the correctness of the search range of sum s
within [sL, sH ].
Lemma 13. For true weights w, true weight sum s =
∑
wi, and i
∗ with wi ≤ s/2 for i 6= i
∗, sum
s is contained in interval [sL, sH ] (defined in step 1 of the algorithm for i
∗).
Proof. First for the lower bound sL, the assumption of the lemma requires i 6= i
∗ satisfy wi ≤ s/2.
Therefore the true pair (s,wi) must be a point in P
ρ
i , and the true sum s must be at least the lower
bound rρi for each i 6= i
∗.
Second for the upper bound sH , recall the definition
πρi∗(s) := πi∗(max{s −
∑
i 6=i∗
wρi (s), wi∗(0)},w
ρ
−i∗(s))
which uses a guess at the total weights s′ to guess the corresponding the weight of agent i∗ as
(s′ −
∑
i 6=i∗ w
ρ
i (s
′)). In fact, this guessed weight is strictly increasing in s′ as each term in the
negated sum is strictly decreasing (Lemma 9). Our choice of sH equates this guessed weight with
its highest possible value wi∗(h). By monotonicity of the guessed weight the true s must be at most
sH .
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